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COMMENT
THE OTP CABLE PROPOSALS: AN END
TO REGULATORY MYOPIA
Cable television,' the transmission and reception of video and audio signals
along a coaxial cable, is simply another means of sending an information-
filled electronic signal into the viewer's home or business. Communication
by broadcasting, although most effective in terms of broad area coverage
at a relatively low cost, is subject to reception interference which is often un-
controllable. For example, broadcast reception in New York City, within
five miles of the central transmitter site, is far worse than television reception
in Westchester or Nassau counties, -twenty miles further away, simply be-
cause of the multiple reflections from the tall buildings. 2 More significantly,
American urban areas are plagued by an acute shortage of available elec-
tronic spectrum, mainly because television broadcast stations must utilize
such an enormous part of an essentially finite spectrum to transmit their
signals to the public. 3
Cable television developed as a simple "master antenna" service in re-
sponse to broadcasting's inability to serve adequately outlying areas. The
public wanted television, and soon entrepreneurs in the rural sections in-
1. A "classical" cable television system has four main components. (1) Television
signals are received by an antenna or a microwave relay system, or are originated at
some local point. (2) The signals are relayed to a "head-end," amplified, and often
changed in frequency. (3) They are then sent to different areas of the community over
trunk and feeder lines. (4) Lastly, drop lines extending from the trunk or feeder lines
transport the signals into the subscriber's home. See Knox, Cable Television, SCIENTIFIC
AM., Oct. 1971, at 22. For a much more detailed description of the technological poten-
tial of cable television, see Baer, Interactive Television: Prospects for Two-Way Services
on Cable, (The Rand Corp. R-888-MF, 1971).
2. Rosner, Television Broadcasting and the Wired City, 17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
BROADCASTING 43 (1971).
3. A single television signal requires a frequency range almost six times the elec-
tronic band width of the entire capacity necessary for commercial AM radio. For a
discussion of the difficulties this huge allocation of the spectrum has caused other poten-
tial users, see H. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE: USE AND REGULATION OF THE RADIO
SPECTRUM (1971).
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stalled tall antennae to pick up the faint distant broadcast signals.4 Thus
cable television became an adjunct to broadcasting and was christened Com-
munity Antenna Television (CATV). Twenty-five years later the industry
is still struggling to wrest itself free of broadcasting's influence, economics,
terminology, and its federal regulator, the Federal Communications Com-
mission.
The conflicts that have arisen before the Congress, the FCC and the courts
have centered on the competitive struggle between the two industries. But
these disputes should not have led the FCC to confuse so completely 5 the
content of the cable medium with the medium itself. As McLuhan 'has
written: "The content of any medium is always another medium. The con-
tent of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and
print is the content of the telegraph."
The difference is not merely metaphysical, for it has practical and legal
consequences as well. Cable television is as different from broadcast tele-
vision as is the laser from the light bulb. This analogy is sound in that the
light bulb is useful for illuminating large areas, while the laser's incredible
directional and focusing capabilities make it eminently more suited for har-
nessing the power of light. Contrary to the pronouncements of broadcasters, 7
the FCC8 and the Supreme Court,9 cable television is not even "ancillary"
to broadcasting, but is a completely new medium for individual expression.
Admittedly, television signals pulse through its connections; but to erect a
statutory scheme upon that superficially appealing foundation is both to
ignore the traditional rationales for the regulation of broadcasting and, more
significantly, to doom cable to a stunted growth. 10
4. See p. 95 infra.
5. This confusion has been implicit in the FCC's attitude toward cable television
for some time. In 1969, Rosel H. Hyde, then chairman of the FCC testified that
the FCC's goal was "to integrate the CATV operation into the national television struc-
ture in a manner which does not undermine the television broadcast service ...."
Hearings on H.R. 10268 & H.R. 10510 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and
Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 91, at 10-11 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
6. M. MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSION OF MAN (paperback ed.
1965).
7. See Note, The Childhood of CATV, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 382 (1969).
8. Second Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
9. See p. 99 & note 43 infra.
10. It would appear that cable's growth has already been stunted by the uncertain
regulatory and economic environment. Fred W. Friendly, a well-respected broadcast
scholar and consultant to the Ford Foundation, testified to this effect during the 1967
hearings before the House of Representatives on the Public Broadcasting bill: "I think
by 1975 the whole profile of how we communicate in this country is going to be changed
greatly by CATV . . . . CATV might revolutionize television as much as satellites, as
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Practically, the differences between the two media are patent. Broad-
casting is an advertiser-supported medium. Transmitting over wide geo-
graphic areas to audiences numbering in the tens of millions, the broad-
cast networks, in effect, sell to the advertiser the audience which is attracted
to their particular program. The limited electromagnetic spectrum allows
only six or seven stations -to operate in any one city, hence air time is a
scarce ,and expensive commodity. The larger the audience the more the ad-
vertiser is willing to pay, so that each precious moment is programmed to
maximize the audience size. Cable, on the other hand, serves local areas
or single communities," and is supported mainly by subscriber revenues.
There is no scarcity of channel space, and productions can be specifically
directed to 'audiences which are miniscule by broadcast standards. The po-
tential of cable for increasing electronic communication services has been
repeatedly heralded, 12 and it is not the purpose here to detail that potential.
It is sufficient to emphasize that as long as the Congress, the FCC and the
courts continue to treat cable television as if it were a part of broadcasting,
its vast potential will fail to develop.
No matter what the reason for this failure-broadcast industry resistance,
governmental myopia, economic difficulties-it is time for both the private
and public sectors to recognize that the present course of ever-increasing
regulation at every level-federal, state and local---could easily close the
door on cable's undoubted technological advances, much to the detriment of
the American people.
The public's stake in this media controversy is great, and is best exemp-
lified by the continuing attempts by differing groups to obtain access to the
electronic media.'3 This desire to communicate personal views through the
much as television has revolutionized radio." Hearings on H.R. 6736 & S. 1160 Before
the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., at 408 (1967). Mr. Friendly's hopeful forecast
has not come to pass. See Kriegsman, Assessing the Clouds in Cable's Blue Sky, The
Washington Post, March 24, 1974, § L, at 1, col. 3 and Shales, Cable TV's Gap Between
Promise and Progress, The Washington Post, June 12, 1974, § C, at 1, col. 1.
11. Irving Kahn has discussed the selective programming that is possible on the cable.
In 1969, his cable television company served upper Manhattan, encompassing about
400,000 dwellings units, a small figure by broadcast standards. But this popula-
tion was further broken down into communities of approximately 30,000 homes, so
that a little league baseball game played in Inwood was shown only to the community
of Inwood, where the local interest existed, not in west Manhattan or Harlem. Also,
according to Kahn, such programming can "outdraw a network show any day of the
week." The game cost about $1,000 to produce. See 1969 Hearings 65.
12. See, e.g., Smith, The Wired Nation, 210 THE NATION 605 (1970); Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry on CATV, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 420 (1968).
13. See p. 107 infra.
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national media lies at the heart of two Supreme Court decisions rendered
within the past eighteen months. 14 In both cases the access seekers were re-
sponding to the innate inadequacy of the present centralized television and
newspaper structures to cover all the views, all the time. Thus, the desire
for access can be viewed, like cable itself, as a reaction to present media limi-
tations. Caught in a quandary of competing first amendment interests, the
Court 'held that the prerogatives of the newspaper and broadcast industries
outweighed the right of the public to force them to publish 15 or broadcast"
particular divergent views. These decisions, while in line with the traditional
view of a free press unfettered by government restraints, clearly limit the pub-
lic's opportunities for effective self-expression. Accordingly, when a different
conduit for communication evolves, one which is characterized by an abun-
dant capacity for transmitting human messages, such a medium should be
carefully nurtured and allowed to develop fully as soon as possible.
Cable television is such a medium. While a commercial broadcaster
cannot afford to "turn off" any listeners for fear of losing advertising rev-
enue,' 7 the cable operator must seek diversity to make his total "channel
package" attractive to the prospective subscriber.
Of course, no one questions the desirability of theoretical public access
and increased channel diversity, but just how such worthy goals are to be
accomplished presents a much more difficult question. Fortunately, per-
haps, only two choices are presently available. The first, championed by the
FCC, simply provides that the cable industry be regulated as pervasively as
broadcasting, if not more so.' 8 The second approach, recently proposed by
the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP),' 9 would divest the FCC of
many of its asserted powers, would nevertheless not allow the cable operator
14. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974) (Florida statute
which grants a political candidate a "right to reply," and compels a newspaper to grant
space for that reply, held unconstitutional); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973); see pp. 109-10 infra.
15. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
16. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
17. In CBS, Justice Brennan asserted that broadcasters, unlike newspapers, will delib-
erately avoid as much controversy as possible, fearing that such controversy may inhibit
the profits gained from standard product advertising. id. at 187. See also Jaffe,
The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access,
85 HARv. L. REV. 768, 773-74 n.26 (1972).
18. See pp. 104-06 infra.
19. The OTP proposal is actually based on a report issued by the Cabinet Committee
on Communications which was submitted to President Nixon on January 14, 1974 by
the Chairman of the Committee and head of the Office of Telecommunications Policy,
Clay T. Whitehead. Letter from Clay T. Whitehead to President Richard M. Nixon,
January 14, 1974, in CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE: RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIENT (1974) [hereinafter cited as CABLE REPORT].
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to control the program content of the separate channels, and would provide
for greater local government regulatory autonomy.20
As the discussion below indicates, OTP's proposal presents the most rea-
sonable alternative when examined in the light of the history of cable tele-
vision and the FCC's regulatory reactions as exemplified through the devel-
opment of public access -to cable television.
I. CABLE TELEVISION: A TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO
BROADCASTING
A. An Historical Summary
The cable television industry had its genesis in the late 1940's and early
1950's. Although there are disputes among the pioneers, L. E. "Ed" Parsons
is generally credited with having begun -the first cable system in Astoria,
Oregon in 1949.21 The operator of a radio station, Parsons responded to
his wife's desire to have "pictures with her radio" by traveling around Clat-
sop County, Oregon with signal survey equipment in an attempt -to pick up
television signals from Seattle, Washington, 125 miles away. He succeeded
by placing an antenna atop a local hotel and promptly developed a sending
unit which extended the service to others, at a rate of $100 per installation.
Quite an entrepreneur, Parsons then sold television sets to the subscribers.
22
Almost simultaneously, cable systems were developing in the mountainous
areas of Pennsylvania where television reception was marginal at best. The
public demanded television, and, although many of the pioneer cable oper-
ators were motivated by a desire to sell television sets, the subscribers pro-
vided the market and the capital for the infant industry. 23 Until the United
States Tax Court's ruling to the contrary in 1957,24 the operators declared
the $125 to $200 installation charges as non-taxable income or "contribu-
tions-in-aid-of-construction," and applied it almost entirely to construction.
One commentator has suggested that without this tax break during the early
years the cable industry might not have survived at all.
25
20. See pp. 115-16 infra.
21. Smith, The Emergence of CATV: A Look at the Evolution of a Revolution, 58
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 967 (1970).
22. The story of L. E. Parsons has been documented in M. Mayer, A Historical Study
of the Issues and Policies Related to the Educational Application and Utilization of
Community Antenna Television, (Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern Univ., Evanston, Ill.
1969), cited in Smith, supra note 21, at 968 n.6.
23. See M. SEDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION
SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY (1965).
24. See, e.g., Teleservice Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 722 (1957).
25. Smith, supra note 21, at 969.
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Perhaps the most significant early legal development was the nearly uni-
versal utilization of cable "franchises." Seemingly without precedent, these
franchises were issued by the community to be served as a means of grant-
ing the requisite permission to cross public streets 'and alleyways with relay
cables. Although most state grants of this privilege were to public utilities,
the public's demand for television was such that the local authorities' right
to franchise was seldom challenged 26 and has been established de facto
without significant resort to the courts.
Cable continued to expand. However, since an FCC "freeze" on the is-
suance of new broadcast television licenses seemed to be cable's raison d'6tre,
27
the Commission's implementation of a nationwide Television Allocation
Plan 28 ending the "freeze" in 1952 should have meant the early demise of
cable television. Indeed, cable television was entirely excluded from the
Allocation Plan despite its 14,000 subscribers, an indication of the indif-
ference to -the cable industry at the time.
29
After the "freeze" on new television stations was lifted, broadcasters
realized that cable could do more than slightly expand their markets. Com-
petitive animosity soon developed, and as early 'as 1954 'a small town broad-
cast station (WJPB-TV) in Fairmont, West Virginia (population 29,346)
filed a petition with the FCC "to define the existence or extent of the juris-
diction of the FCC with respect to the installation and operation of any com-
munity antenna television distribution system, to the end that the same rules
and orders of the commission applicable -to television stations shall apply to
26. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE § 65-10 (1950) for an example of the
procedures for granting such franchises during the early years of cable's growth. The
first cable franchise agreements normally did not specify rates for service nor did they
provide any type of rate control. Most were merely ordinances granting permission to
cross streets, alleys, and granting limited access rights to set poles. More recently, how-
ever, it has become common for franchising authorities to establish explicit connection
and service charges, and some require authorization for rate increases. Although cable
operators have consistently opposed classification of their operations as public utilities,
their natural monopoly status and need for public rights-of-way has caused them to ex-
perience great difficulty in attempting to increase their charges. Moreover, these factors
have precipitated new, extremely detailed, comprehensive state cable statutes which in
the area of ratemaking grant broad discretion to local authorities. See, e.g., CABLE TEL-
EVISION AcT, 48 N.J.S.A. § 5A (Supp. 1974); N.Y. CABLE TELEVISION LAW ch. 466,
§ 825 (McKinney 1972).
27. Smith, supra note 21, at 969.
28. Sixth Report and Order No. 8736, 91 P & F RADIO REG. 601 (1952).
29. 39 TELEVISION FAcTBOOK 79-a, Table 1 (1952). The National Cable Television
Association has recently announced that in 1973 there were an estimated 8 million sub-
scribers to over 3,000 systems, and that cable revenues reached $468.1 million, a gain




community television distribution systems." °30 In 1958, the FCC decided
that it was "doubtful" that cable television fell under its statutory jurisdic-
,tion.3' But a month later it began an inquiry into the "impact" of cable on
the "orderly development of television broadcasting. '13 2  The broadcasters
also turned to Congress for shelter. The Senate Subcommittee on Commun-
ications conducted hearings in 1958 on the 'alleged "unfair competition" of
cable television with broadcast television.3 3 When Congress ultimately re-
30. The petition is quoted in Inquiry into the Development of CATV and Repeater
Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 404 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Inquiry].
31. "[lit appears doubtful to the Commission that any of those [broadcasting] provi-
sions may be fairly interpreted to reach CATV systems. Such systems operate by means
of wire lines, and ... involve no radio transmission which might require some form
of license from the Commission." Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Laramie County
"V Co., 24 F.C.C. 251, 255-56 (1958) (complaint filed by 13 broadcast television licen-
sees against 288 CATV operators, requesting that the FCC exercise common carrier ju-
risdiction over cable systems). This doubt was first mentioned judicially in Clarksburg
Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where Circuit Judge Bazelon
remanded the FCC's grant of a television station construction permit back to the FCC
for further hearings:
Although it has been studying the question for some time, the Commission is
uncertain whether the [cable] system should be deemed a broadcast service or
a common carrier, and whether its operations are sufficiently interstate in char-
acter to justify or require federal regulation.
Id. at 517 n.18. See also Address by Commissioner John C. Doerfer, National
Ass'n of R.R. and Util. Comm'rs, in 14 FED. CoM. B.J. 4, 5 (1955); Lilly v. United
States, 238 F.2d 584, 586 (4th Cir. 1956).
32. On May 22, 1958, the FCC released a notice of inquiry concerning cable televi-
sion. After soliciting and receiving evidence for nearly a year from the groups involved,
the FCC promulgated a Report and Order on April 13, 1959. Prior to this inquiry, the
only affirmative regulatory action taken toward cable television by the FCC was in 1956
when the FCC issued construction and insulation standards for the cables so that they
would not "leak" any electronic signals and thus interfere with the standard broadcast
signals. See 21 Fed. Reg. 5368 (1956).
33. Allegations of "unfair competition" have been the FCC's and broadcaster's main-
stay. Naturally, the more successful the cable system the more unfair the competition
is alleged to be. By taking this position, the FCC can use cable's potential to serve
a great number of people in a community to keep cable out of the community. One
example arose during the hearings on the cable installations in San Diego, California.
See Decision on Extension of CATV, 13 F.C.C.2d 478 (1968). The hearings showed
that cable penetration into the market, with the importation of distant broadcast signals,
could be substantial, including as many as 50% of the TV homes. San Diego was the
fiftieth largest television market at the time, with three network stations, a new inde-
pendent UHF and one educational station. As Rozel Hyde, then Chairman of the
FCC, testified during congressional hearings, "The effect of the unfair competition of
present CATV operation upon local TV broadcast operations would be significant be-
cause the penetration of CATV would be of a significant nature." 1969 Hearings 14.
Thus certain increased television service for the many was denied so that competition
over potential service to a few would not be heightened.
Based mainly on the San Diego case, the FCC decided in December 1968 to impose
a rule that would permit cable systems to carry distant signals within specified thirty-
1974]
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jected several bills 34 which would have provided for regulation of cable, the
FCC moved in to fill the regulatory vacuum.
35
In 1962, the FCC, at the request of a small television station, denied a
construction permit to a company which sought to retransmit distant broad-
cast television signals to local cable systems;36 its decision was affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.37
Strengthened by this decision, and drawing on information which predicted a
five mile zones within the 100 largest TV markets, only if the system has the express
authorization of the originating stations to retransmit the program or program series
being carried. This rule is analogous to the consent provision embodied in § 325(a)
of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1971), and applicable to
broadcast stations. See 1969 Hearings 14.
34. They were introduced in Congress in 1959. After hearings, the Subcommittee
on Communications of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee reported
its own bill to the Senate, S. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The debate lasted
for two days on the Senate floor, but the bill was recommitted and subsequently died.
During the next Congress the FCC requested the introduction of another bill, S. 1044
and H.R. 6840, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), but it was not acted upon at all. After
the FCC released its First Report and Order on Microwave-served CATV, 38 F.C.C.
683 (1965), extensive hearings were held on a third bill, beginning on May 28, 1965,
but no further action was taken. See Hearings on H.R. 7715 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). One year later, Representative Harley 0. Staggers (D-
W. Va.), Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, introduced,
again at the request of the FCC, a bill which would have given the FCC broad authority
to regulate cable television. H.R. 13286, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966). Congressman
Paul G. Rogers (D-Fla.) then introduced an opposing bill which would have denied the
FCC's authority in the cable field. H.R. 13286 was approved during the hearings, and
reported to the House by the Committee on June 17, 1966, substantially as submitted by
the FCC, but once again the bill was not enacted. Congress having failed to act, the
FCC stepped in with "interim procedures" promulgated in December 1968. See Notice
of Proposed Rule-making and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
35. The FCC has repeatedly stated that it would "welcome (i) a congressional guid-
ance as to policy, and (ii) congressional clarification of our authority, which would lay
the troublesome jurisdictional question at rest;" but the entreaties remain unheeded. See
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 n.30 (1968); Second Report
and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 734 (1966); Inquiry 421. It is well to note that
at least two dozen members of Congress have personal interests in broadcasting proper-
ties, perhaps explaining congressional caution over the emerging cable industry. See
L. KOHLMEIER, JR., THE REGuLATORs 61 (1969).
36. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962).
37. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The Carter Mountain decision represents a landmark in
cable regulation, ostensibly because it affirmed the FCC's right to regulate cable televi-
sion under the authority of the broadcast-oriented federal Communications Act of 1934.
However, the Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. was not a cable system but a micro-
wave common carrier; no cable system was even before the court. Secondly, although the
appellants raised the issue of the FCC's wrongful exercise of jurisdiction over cable sys-
tems, the court held that the FCC's denial of the application to transmit to cable sys-
tems was not an attempt to regulate the cable systems. 321 F.2d at 363-64.
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significant economic impact on broadcasters,8" the FCC abandoned case-by-
case adjudication in favor of rulemaking proceedings39 affecting all cable
systems, utilizing microwave relays to transmit the signals. 40  Less than a
year later the FCC extended the coverage of its rules to all cable systems,
whether or not they used microwave. 41 The FCC's rules reflected the broad-
cast industry's view that cable was an unfair compatitor with broadcasting. 42
In a landmark case which judicially sanotioned the FCC's rulemaking au-
thority, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,43
38. See, e.g., M. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVI-
SION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY (1965).
39. The distinctions between rulemaking and case-by-case adjudication by regulatory
agencies are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (1970).
The Act defines "rule" in § 551(4) as "an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or pol-
icy." The Act further defines "adjudication" as the "process" for formulating an "order"
or the "final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in
form, of an agency . . . other than rulemaking." 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)-(7) (1970).
Although the dissimilarities are by no means clear, the rulemaking procedure allows
the agency to issue more general regulations of future effect, following a general notice
of their proposed rules in the Federal Register and submission of written materials by
"interested persons," with or without oral argument. After consideration, the agency
may adopt rules incorporating within them a "concise general statement of their basis
and purpose." For commentary on these two types of administrative action, see gener-
ally Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV. 921, 958-
67 (1965).
40. First Report and Order on CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). Simultaneously, the
FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which included a memorandum asserting
the FCC's authority to regulate all cable systems, microwave and non-microwave. The
Notice also detailed certain issues to be considered in subsequent hearings on the nature
and necessity of cable regulations. I F.C.C.2d 453, 465 (1965).
41. Second Report and Order On CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). These rules were
superseded in 1972, but they are codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1101, 1109 (1971). Signifi-
cantly, these rules dealt extensively with cable's supposedly greatest threat to broadcast-
ing-distant signal importation. Whereas in broadcasting additional program services
are presumed to be in the public interest, under § 74.1107 the cable television operator
had to show, at an evidentiary hearing, that importation of distant signals into the 100
largest television markets would "be consistent with the public interest, and specifically
the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area."
No definition of "healthy maintenance" was given.
42. See Second Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 778-79 (1966); see
also note 33 supra. At least one court has disagreed, holding that cable did not unfairly
compete with broadcasting. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47 (D.
Idaho 1962), rev'd, 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964) (antitrust action brought by cable sys-
tem against a broadcast television station which counterclaimed, alleging tortious inter-
ference with contractual rights and unfair competition).
43. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Justices Douglas and Marshall did not take part in the
consideration of the case. Justice White concurred, basing his separate opinion on the
statutory mandate of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1971).
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found the cable regulations to be "reasonably ancillary to the effective per-
formance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting. '44  Ironically, the Court relieved cable systems
from copyright liability during the same term, 45 declaring that simply operat-
ing a master antenna reception service was not a "performance" under the
Copyright Act of 1909.
4 3
With its authority thus acknowledged, 47 the FCC soon issued the Notice
of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Docket 18397,48 which
demanded, as later clarified, 49 that a cable operator could not import any
distant television signals into a local market unless he first obtained pro-
44. 392 U.S. at 178.
45. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Corp., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). This view was recently reaffirmed in TelePrompter Corp.
v. CBS, 94 S. Ct. 1129 (1974). The TelePrompter litigation was initially stayed by
agreement of the parties, pending the Supreme Court's Fortnightly decision. After that
decision the plaintiffs sought to distinguish the cable system defendants from those
whose operations had been held not to violate the copyright law in Fortnightly. The
issues were slightly different. Unlike Fortnightly, the defendants in TelePrompter were
transmitting broadcast signals from stations hundreds of miles away and were engaged
in program origination. Neither of the three federal courts which considered the ques-
tion felt that these factors involved copyright infringement. Immediately after the Court
rendered the TelePrompter decision the broadcast and motion picture lobbying groups
began pressing for a revised copyright law that will cover cable television. Indeed,
within a few months after the TelePrompter decision, the Senate Judiciary Committee
held hearings concerning the proper computation ratio for copyright fees to be imposed
on cable operators. See Carmody, A Cable TV Victory: Still in the Big League,
The Washington Post, June 12, 1974, § C, at 4, col. 1.
47. The FCC's sudden assumption of wide-ranging rulemaking authority in this area,
based on the Southwestern case, was quickly questioned by some members of Congress.
This exchange occurred during the 1969 hearings of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce between Rozel Hyde, then Chairman of the FCC, and Represen-
tative Torbert H. MacDonald (D-Mass.):
Mr. MacDonald: Mr. Chairman, aren't you assuming quite a good deal from
stretching that point in the case you cite? They say that your right comes if
it is reasonably ancillary.
Mr. Hyde: Yes.
Mr. MacDonald: Now that still is subject to appeal to the Court if somebody
does not think you are being reasonable?
Mr. Hyde: Any particular case can, of course, be appealed and if our rules
are not found to be reasonable we will lose.
Mr. MacDonald: Right. But when you make the blanket assumption that you
do have the authority, I just query that. I was hoping that other members of
the subcommittee would also not just take your words at face value, although
I know you mean them in the best way possible, but there is a question about
that. It is not black and white.
Mr. Hyde: There is argument about it, you are right.
1969 Hearings 36.
48. 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
49. 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
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gram-by-program approval from each party that owned any segment of the
broadcast. This requirement made the importation into the local market of
audience-attracting signals originating at distant stations virtually impossible,
resulting in a "freeze" on cable expansion 0 similar to the one clamped on
the broadcast industry which had been partially responsible for cable's early
growth. During this nearly four-year hiatus, lasting until early 1972, the
FCC examined cable's impact on broadcasting, 51 Congress held hearings, 52
cable study groups issued reports,58 visionaries exulted its potential54 and the
public waited. 55
Finally -the FCC promulgated a confusing, 50 albeit comprehensive set of
regulations 57 imposing many conditions on cable system operation. It was
during the "freeze," however, as one noted commentator has suggested, that
the "Commission appeared to have substantially altered its relationship with
this media challenger by bringing cable within the process it had previously
threatened."58 Thus, those four years are crucial to an understanding of
the present relationship between the FCC and cable television.
B. The FCC v. Cable Television: Cablecasting Becomes Broadcasting
Federal regulation was first imposed on the broadcasting industry because
the lack of frequency standards had resulted in a "cacophony of competing
voices" clogging the public airways, "none of which could be clearly or pre-
dictably heard."59  By establishing the FCC, and its predecessor, the Federal
50. This de facto freeze was rather openly discussed by a dissenting member of the
Commission. CATV Interim Procedures, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1517, 1529 (1969)
(dissenting opinion). Such regulatory reactions to new technology have occurred be-
fore. See LeDuc, The FCC v. CATV et al.: A Theory of Regulatory Reflex Action,
23 FED. COM. B.J. 93 (1969).
51. See, e.g., 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
52. See, e.g., 1969 Hearings, supra note 5.
53. See, e.g., SLOAN COMMISSION, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE
(1971); THE URBAN INSTITUTE, CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES: COMMUNITY CON-
TROL, PUBLIC ACCESS, AND MINORITY OWNERSmP (1971).
54. E.g., Smith, The Wired Nation, 210 THE NATION 582 (1970).
55. What's Ahead For Television, NEwswEEK, May 31, 1971, at 72.
56. "Mhe new rules contain provisions that create confusion even among practi-
tioners of the esoteric art of communications law. For the uninitiated lawyer, the rules
are enough to make him throw up his hands in horror." Hochberg, Which Way is Cable
TV Going?, 59 A.B.A.J. 77 (1973).
57. 37 Fed. Reg. 3252 (1972), reconsidered, 37 Fed. Reg. 13848 (1972).
58. D. LEDUC, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL 182
(1973).
59. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). See also 60 GEO.
L.J. 871, 1032 (1972).
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Radio Commission,60 Congress sought to organize the allocation of broad-
cast frequencies and thus end the signal interference. In performing this
function, the FCC requires that those wishing to broadcast be licensed, and
that such licenses only be granted when the public interest, convenience or
necessity will be served. 61 This licensing power has been construed broadly,
62
and the "public interest" banner has been used to deny broadcast licenses, 68
prohibit "offensive" speech,64 and more specifically to regulate program con-
tent.6 5
Historically this governmental control over a medium of public expression
has been premised upon the inherent limitations of the broadcast spectrum.
Despite the public nature of the airwaves, they cannot be available to all
at once; hence regulation must be imposed to assure that the spirit, if not
the letter, of the first amendment will be preserved. 6  It is clear that without
this spectrum limitation, a government agency would be hard pressed to con-
stitutionally justify the regulation of program content, especially when car-
ried out under 'any rule which exercised a prior restraint67 over what could
be broadcast.
This may seem like elementary first amendment theory. It may also seem
elementary that the rationale of the limited electronic spectrum cannot be
applied to cable television because it presently has more than enough chan-
nel capacity to accommodate those who wish to speak out, and that, there-
fore, cable regulation raises constitutional questions that broadcast regulation
does not. The FCC, however, summarily rejected this seemingly obvious
60. The Feceral Radio Commission was established under the Radio Act of 1927,
ch. 4, 44 Stat. 1162.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1971).
62. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214-18 (1943).
63. See generally Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on
40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 98-103 (1967).
64. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964). Congress declared the
broadcast of such speech to be a criminal act in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970).
65. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969). One federal judge has recently expressed misgivings about the
FCC's role in regulating program content. Citizens Commission to Save WEFM v. FCC,
No. 73-1057 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
66. "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). This decision clarified the
premise enunciated earlier, most notably in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226
(1943).
67. "Prior restraints" on first amendment rights have long been disfavored, the clas-
sic example being Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Minnesota




consideration in its CATV First Report and Order, and, instead, confused
the "content" of a medium with the medium itself:
Since CATV systems use broadcast signals as the backbone of the
service they provide, they come within the regulation of this
agency, if reasonably related to the public interest. If the regula-
tion is so related, it is not barred by the first amendment. It is
thus immaterial -that the scarcity of frequencies rationale underlying
first amendment rulings in the broadcast field does not apply di-
rectly to the cable technology. 8
Calling this dismissal of the constitutional issue "highly unsatisfying,"6 9 a
recent commentator implies, after an exhaustive analysis of all the justifica-
tions for regulating cable as an "adjunct" to broadcasting, that cable should
be given the much broader constitutional protection afforded the print me-
dia.70  Admittedly such protestations are rather like yelling "fire" while stand-
ing in the ashes, as the constitutional issue has become fairly moot and is un-
likely to arise again. This is so because the necessity of some sort of federal
regulation has long been accepted by the industries involved, 71 and the FCC
has now constructed a massive set of regulations which rest upon the narrow
authority granted the Commission by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp.
72
In Midwest a substantially divided Court upheld the FCC's authority to
regulate cable, with Chief Justice Burger furnishing a reluctant deciding vote.
He was not "fully persuaded"73 that the FCC could force cablecasters to
originate local programming:
Candor requires acknowledgment. . . that the Commission's posi-
tion strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive
jurisdiction that has evolved by the decisions of the Commission
-and the courts. The most explosive development of CATV sug-
gests the need for a comprehensive re-examination of the statutory
scheme as it relates to this new development, so that the basic poli-
cies are considered by Congress and not left entirely to the Com-
mission and the courts.
74
68. 34 Fed. Reg. 17651, 17658-59 (1969).
69. Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1008,
1014, 1038 (1972).
70. Id. at 1014, 1038.
71. "I think that if we had a regulatory role clearly defined by Congress, under which
the Commission would work, it should and would control broadly how cable is used
... " Statement by I. Kahn, then president of a large cable television enterprise, Tele-
Prompter Corporation, in 1969 Hearings 45.
72. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
73. Id. at 676.
74. Id.
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Chief Justice Burger's comments, coupled with the vigorous dissent of four
Justices, 75 certainly indicates a realization, at least implicitly, that insur-
mountable problems may arise when an agency organized for, and engaged
in, the regulation of broadcasting and common carriers assumes control over
a medium which involves neither.
C. The 1972 Rules: The FCC Assumes Control
The present FCC cable regulations, enacted in 1972, are the product of a
"prolonged running battle" 76 among cable, broadcast, motion picture and
copyright interests. They naturally focus on specifically limiting cable's
retransmission of television broadcast signals. The rules do permit expan-
sion of cable into major metropolitan areas but they also contain restraints
which are designed, in the view of the FCC, to limit the competitive threat
to the existing broadcast industry77 and to stimulate the use of cable for non-
broadcast services. 78
The rules require that each newly-franchised cable system obtain a "Cer-
tificate of Compliance" -from the FCC before it begins to carry broadcast
television signals.7 9  This permits the Commission to determine whether the
local franchising process, ithe -franchise agreement and the design of the cable
system comply with FCC requirements. The certification process also per-
mits the applicant and the franchising authority to request waivers of, or
"special relief" from, the FCC's requirements if the "grant of such relief
would serve the public interest."80
Presently a two-tier regulatory system exists. The FCC regulates the
carriage of broadcast television and radio signals on the cable;8 ' exclusive
program channel rights;8 2 the total channel capacity required;8 cablecasting,
75. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist dissented.
76. Price & Botein, Cable Television: Citizen Participation After the Franchise 2
(The Rand Corp. R-1139-NSF, 1973).
77. See note 33 supra.
78. D. LEDuc, supra note 58, at 194.
79. 47 C.F.R. § 76.11 (1973).
80. 47 C.F.R. § 76.7 (1973). Under this extraordinary provision, entitled "Special
Relief," a cable system, franchising authority, television broadcaster or any "other in-
terested person" may petition the FCC to waive any provision of the rules, impose addi-
tional or different requirements, or issue a ruling. The petition can be by informal let-
ter, supported by appropriate affidavits, but the FCC can specify other procedures, such
as oral argument, an evidentiary hearing, or further written submissions "as it deems
appropriate."
81. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-.65 (1973).
82. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.91-.159 (1973).
83. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1973). The eventual expansion of cable systems is pro-
vided for under the following criterion:
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or program origination by the cable operator;8 4 technical operational pro-
cedures and requirements;8 5 and minimum franchising requirements to which
the local authority must adhere.86  Local authorities select the franchisee,
prescribe subscriber rates, monitor the cable system's performance and com-
pliance with the regulations and permissible modes of operation which they
have established.87 A third tier of regulation is developing at the state level.
Only a few states have enacted cable regulations so far 8 but it seems likely
that eventually most states will exert some degree of authority. The extent
of -this authority is as yet unknown, however, since the FCC has preempted
the non-local areas of regulation. 9
As far as actual channel usage is concerned, the rules establish certain
minimum requirements 'and compel ite system operator to install equip-
ment which has the capacity to accommodate new services. Specifically, four
channels must be allocated to "access"-one each for the public, the govern-
ment, education and at least one for other leasing purposes. The cable system
operator must carry all local broadcast stations and locally originate his
own programming on 'at least one channel.90  The operator is permitted to
import a few distant broadcast signals, usually one or two. 9'
A minimum twenty-channel capacity must be provided, with at least one
channel available for non-broadcast use for each channel used to carry broad-
Whenever all of the channels described in subparagraphs (4) through (7) of
this paragraph are in use during 80 percent of the weekdays (Monday-Friday)
for 80 percent of the time during any consecutive 3 hour period for 6 consecu-
tive weeks, such system shall have 6 months in which to make a new channel
available for any or all of the above-described purposes ...
Id.
84. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.201-.251 (1973).
85. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.301-.311 (1973).
86. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1973).
87. Id. This provision actually places the burden on the cable operator to make sure
that his local franchising authority satisfies the general requirements of the federal stat-
ute, for if it does not he will be unable to obtain his certificate of compliance from the
FCC.
88. See note 26 supra.
89. The present Chairman of the FCC, Richard E. Wiley, has commented:
[O]ne of the most difficult issues in question involves the consideration of the
constitutional, regulatory, and procedural problems in the jointly asserted juris-
dictional areas on the federal, state, and local levels, particularly where, as in
New York, the state government is intending to set "standards" as to the very
factors already determined in the Commission's report.
Wiley, Procedural Accommodation of Federal and State Regulatory Interests in Cable
Television, 25 AD. L. REV. 213, 222 (1973).
90. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1973). The program origination requirement is one area
where the FCC's proposals have not been favored by the broadcast industry. See, e.g.,
1969 Hearings 289.
91. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-77.65 (1973).
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cast signals. 92  For example, if the system carries ten broadcast signals,
a total of twenty channels must be made available. Although no time limit
is imposed, each system must have the built-in capacity to furnish two-way
communication between the subscriber and the cable control center.
93
Of course this brief description of the FCC's rules gives only a glimpse of
their complexity. Indeed, they have been described as being as "intricate as
a Chinese puzzle"94 and sufficiently complex to "create confusion even
among practitioners of the esoteric art of communications law." 95  Indeed,
Broadcasting, the trade organ of the National Association of Broadcasters, de-
scribed the regulations as "the FCC's magnum opus on CATV, . . . some
500 pages of report and order, rules and appendices, separate opinions of
the commissioners, plus collateral items." 90
Fortunately, it is not presently necessary to wade through the entire set of
regulations in order to comprehend the erroneous regulatory approach which
they promote. Rather, this task can be accomplished by focusing on a
particular aspect of the FCC rules and contrasting it with OTP's proposals
on the same aspect of cable television.
The problem of public access to the electronic media presents the best com-
parison. Like cable, the public access movement is a response to the inherent
limitations of broadcasting, and in addition to its obvious first amend-
ment implications, it represents one area where the goal of 'both the FCC
land the OTP are ostensibly identical-the fostering of the public's right to
speak out effectively. Therefore, after a brief historical review of the de-
veloping public access doctrine, the two approaches will be compared.
II. AccEss: THE PEOPLE'S RESPONSE TO BROADCASTING
In 1937, while postulating that the federal government should virtually
take over broadcasting to make it more "democratic," S. E. Frost, Jr. recom-
mended that "[i]nsofar as the limits of radio permit, every individual so de-
siring should be permitted to present his point of view uncensored by any
authority. ' 97  This paradox-everyone has a right to speak, but if everyone
does, no one will hear-has plagued broadcasting since its inception. In re-
sponse, the FCC first demanded that broadcasters provide air time to mem-
92. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(1) (1973).
93. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(3) (1973).
94. D. LEDuc, supra note 58, at 193-94.
95. Hochberg, Which Way is Cable TV Going?, 59 A.B.A.J. 77 (1973).
96. The FCC Delivers On Cable, BROADCASTING, Feb. 7, 1972, at 17.
97. S. FROST, JR., Is AMERICAN RADIO DEMOCRATIC? 204-05 (1937).
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bers of the public who wished to discuss controversial issues, 98 but this pol-
icy soon gave way to an administrative nightmare known as the "fairness
doctrine." 99 Under the two-fold fairness requirement, the broadcaster must
devote a reasonable percentage of time to public issue broadcasting and in-
sure that the public has a reasonable opportunity to hear conflicting positions
on the issues during this programming. 100 When a commercial message ad-
vocates one side of an important and generally recognized public issue, the
doctrine is activated, and the broadcaster must provide time to opposing
points of view. The courts first applied the fairness doctrine to cigarette com-
mercials in Banzhaf v. FCC'0' and continued the reasoning in Friends of the
Earth v. FCC.'02 Although these cases are clearly victories for those at-
tempting to publicize -their views, the fairness doctrine actually does little to
promote access. The criteria are extremely vague, and the access provided
is conditioned on the broadcaster first allowing an issue to be raised.
Recognizing these weaknesses in the fairness doctrine as a vehicle for
the expression of minority views, other groups sought to strike at -the heart
of the -broadcaster's power-his license to broadcast. This license must be
renewed every three years, 0 3 and the FCC uses this renewal process to hear
challenges -to the particular licensee's policies. The practice was initiated
by Everett Parker, 'head of the United Church of Christ's Office of Com-
munications, when he assisted members of a local community in challenging
the license renewal of WLBT-TV in Jackson, Mississippi. The FCC first
denied standing to the viewers, but was resoundingly rebuked by then Cir-
cuit Judge Warren Burger in Office of Communications of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC.10 4  Subsequently, the FCC renewed the license and Judge
Burger ultimately revoked the license.10 5 Finally receiving the message, the
FCC voted three to one to deny renewal to WLBT-TV, 'and promptly prom-
ulgated its Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving
98. United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515, 518 (1945).
99. Editorializing By Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
100. For a more comprehensive analysis of the fairness doctrine, see Jaffe, The Edi-
torial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 768 (1972). This doctrine has been increasingly questioned, and one court has
recently declared that the doctrine does not permit the FCC to judge unilaterally the
content of a broadcasting program. NBC v. FCC, No. 73-2256 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27,
1974).
101. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
102. 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
103. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970).
104. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
105. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Regular Renewal Applicants °6 which proposed that license renewal chal-
lengers show, 'as a condition precedent to challenge, that the incumbent sta-
tion had not rendered "substantial service" to the community. Again, how-
ever, the D.C. Circuit disallowed the FCC's determination, with Judge
Wright stating that such a requirement violated the "public interest" stand-
ard of the Communications Act.107  The broadcasters are still seeking
to blunt the effectiveness of these challenges, however, and an amendment
to the Communications Act has recently been proposed that would lengthen
the licensing period to five years.108 As the response of broadcasters and the
FCC indicates, these license renewal challenges are at least economically
irksome and, according to one report,109 force the stations to be more re-
sponsive to minority views; unfortunately, they are ad hoc procedures and
probably have little effect on the general policies of the broadcast industry.
Thus, neither the fairness doctrine nor license renewal challenges pre-
sents an effective mode of gaining access to the electronic media. In ad-
dition, although a limited right of access was provided by the Communica-
tions Act, 110 the courts historically had refused to grant any individual a con-
stitutional right to demand air time."' In other contexts, however, the Su-
preme Court seemed to be laying the groundwork for just such a constitu-
tional prerogative. In Hague v. CIO,1 12 the Court struck down ordi-
nances which restrict speech in public parks. In the Court's view, these laws
abridged the union's right to communicate effectively with a relevant audi-
ence in an appropriate forum. This right to appropriate forums was extended
to privately owned streets and sidewalks," s shopping malls, 1 4 public
schools,"15 and bus terminals." 60 To many, the first amendment has come
to include not just the traditional right to be free of governmental interference
with personal expression, but a positive right both to speak effectively and to
106. 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
107. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
108. H.R. 12993, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1974).
109. Kuttner, TV Lobby Pushing Bill to Blunt License Challenges, The Washington
Post, July 22, 1974, § D, at 10, col. 1.
110. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
111. Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497
(1st Cir. 1950); accord, McIntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.
1945); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
112. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
113. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
114. Local 590, Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
115. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
116. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968).
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hear the voices of public debate. Further, when the Supreme Court upheld
the fairness doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC117 and announced
that the public's right to view and listen was paramount to the broadcaster's
rights, the promoters of constitutional access claimed victory.' 1 8
This novel constitutional theory was extracted from earlier writings and
was restated, most notably by Professor Jerome Barron in 1967.111 Barron
postulated that the first amendment rights of the established media were
being protected by the courts at -the expense of the public's right to individual
expression. He placed the blame upon the Supreme Court for espousing
an anachronistic, "romantic" view of the first amendment. This traditional
view, derived from the writings of utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill,
holds that truth will only be discovered within a free marketplace of ideas,
without governmental interference. Barron suggests, to the contrary, that
the government must interfere to force the broadcasters to grant paid access
to the -public for the discussion of controversial issues. Without access, he
concluded, effective free speech is denied.
The threshold problem for the proponents of access was, of course, "state
action." Were the broadcasters sufficiently intertwined with the government
for their actions to be considered actions by the state, hence proscribed by
the Constitution? This problem seemed partially resolved by Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak,120 where the Supreme Court invoked the first amend-
ment in support of ,a federal agency's approval of the playing of radio music
within a privately-owned public -transit bus. Moreover, several lower federal
and state courts had found the presence of state action and utilized the Su-
preme Court's "forum" decisions as a basis for granting access to protesters
seeking to publicize their views.' 21
The stage was set for a final declaration by the Supreme Court when Judge
Wright of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in a lengthy and provocative opinion, declared that the right of ac-
cess is mandated by the Constitution. In Business Executives for Vietnam
Peace v. FCC,122 Judge Wright refused to 'allow a radio station the editorial
117. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
118. Statement of Professor Jerome Barron, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.,
at 106 (1972).
119. Barron, Access To The Press--A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
Rpv. 1641 (1967).
120. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
121. See, e.g., Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d
982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
122. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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discretion to reject summarily controversial commercials. Reversing the
FCC, the court found sufficient state action involved in the broadcaster's
conduct and held that an absolute ban on public issue announcements vio-
lated the public's right to be informed, at least when other types of advertise-
ments were accepted. The opinion was the high-water mark for access to
the broadcast media. Nearly two years later, however, the Supreme Court
reversed,1 23 concluding in a 7 to 2 decision that neither the first amendment
nor the Communications Act mandated that broadcasters accept paid editor-
ial advertisements. The majority, however, did not represent a unity of
thought. Six separate opinions were written, each evidencing the difficulty
of applying an amendment written for street orators to protect a medium
which by its very nature limited the public's right of self-expression.
124
A. Public Access and Cable Television
Public access, to an extremely limited degree, began as part of the "local
origination" on the Canadian cable systems in Montreal approximately fifteen
years ago.125  Canadian cable operations expanded quickly and profitably,
largely because they carried the signals of United States broadcasting stations
which were highly attractive to the Canadian audience. Local origination
was therefore simply grafted onto an already large and viable system as a pro-
motional device to build community relations and attract subscribers. Sports
and innocuous educational or instructional programs were emphasized, and
unfortunately, politics and highly controversial issues were avoided. Never-
theless, during a typical week 100 -to 500 local people appeared on the
screen, and the demand for time far exceeded the time made available by
the operator. Although no surveys were made, the cable operators esti-
mated that twenty percent of the audience (Montreal alone had 100,000
subscribers in 1970) had watched the channel at some time.
The first community-operated cable channel in the United States was
made available to the Junior Chamber of Commerce of Dale City, Virginia,
from December 1968 to early 1970.126 The broadcast television reception
123. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
124. Chief Justice Burger announced the Court's judgment and was joined in part by
Justices White, Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist. Separate opinions, concurring in part,
were written by Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun. Justice Douglas concurred in
the judgment only, filing a separate opinion reflecting his particularly divergent views.
Justice Brennan authored the dissent, joined by Justice Marshall. For an analysis of
the several opinions, see 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 339 (1973).
125. The following textual description of the Canadian and Dale City cable systems
was derived from Feldman, Cable Televisions: Opportunities and Problems in Local
Program Origination (The Rand Corp. R-570-FF, 1970).
126. Id. at 10.
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in Dale City was poor, thus ninety-eight percent of the community's 13,000
population subscribed to the cable service. No advertising was carried, and
censorship was provided by an advisory board of the Dale City Civic Associ-
ation, consisting of one representative from such groups as the Jaycees, the
Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, Little League Baseball, the bridge club, PTA's,
all three churches and the volunteer fire department. The system used non-
professional, all-volunteer personnel to produce a one hour program each
week, concentrating on community activities and news. After only a few
months, the community abandoned local origination, primarily because of fi-
nancial difficulties. Before its demise, however, the advisory board prepared
a "Code of Ethics for Community Television" which included this prescription
for bland programming:
The System shall insure that its programming is on a level of dignity
commensurate with the cultural, social and moral standards of the
Community and shall insure that programming is impartial and
nondiscriminatory and not directed at any specific racial, ethnic, so-
cial, cultural or religious group with a latent or implied derogatory
intent. 127
Since July 1, 1971, two channels on each of New York City's cable televi-
sion systems have been offered to the public on a first come, first served basis,
at little or no cost. On the basis of more than two years of work and experi-
mentation, a recent report has concluded that public access has found a "last-
ing if unorganized constituency" and is moving toward the "unpredictable mix
of programming" that its advocates sought. 128 The channels were little used
at first, but by October 1971 several video production groups had begun sub-
mitting programming and channel usage grew steadily. In June 1973, 330
original hours were cablecast by one of the two cable companies franchised
by New York City, and to date more than 2,000 original hours have been
cablecast. Much of the programming has been dull and of poor technical
quality, but the interest in some programs has been great, stimulating public
access experiments throughout the country. 129
Regulation of the public access channels was first handled by the New
York City Office of Telecommunications of the Bureau of Franchises until
the FCC required that the local cable operator be the regulating body be-
ginning in March 1972.130 The two cable companies then established their
own regulations, providing that the company would have the right to pre-
127. Id. at 31.
128. D. ORTHMER, THE WIRED ISLAND: THE FIRST Two YEARS OF PUBLIC AccEss
TO CABLE TELEVISION IN MANHATTAN 1 (1973).
129. Id. at 1-2.
130. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
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view all programs to determine liability and the channel time to be allocated.
Time was allocated on a first come, first served basis, with some restrictions
on the total time, or total prime time allowed each applicant in any given
week.13 l There was no charge for non-commercial presentations, but costs
varied for commercial presentations.
III. A COMPARISON IN ACCESS: THE FCC RULES V. OTP'S PROPOSAL
The FCC has long held the view that a cable system should operate as an
"additional outlet for community self-expression."'1 32 Accordingly, the cur-
rent FCC rules contain a detailed set of provisions dealing with "non-broad-
cast" channel usage, of which '"access" is a part.13 3  Under this provision a
cable system must operate as a "local outlet" to a "significant extent," and
",have available" facilities for local production.134 Access is sub-categorized
into four distinct channels which must be offered by the cable operator.
Three must be offered at no cost-one for the public, one for educational
authorities, one for the government-and the fourth must be available for
leasing. In addition, the operator must satisfy the "need plus one" rule-
whenever all non-broadcast channels "are in use during 80% of the week-
days (Monday-Friday) for 80% of the time during any consecutive three-
hour period for six consecutive weeks," another channel must be provided.' 3 5
In the short span since their promulgation, the access and local origination
rules have been consistently criticized.' 3 6 They are filled with "ambiguities
and pitfall s, '1 3 7 and, worst of all, they impose contradictory duties upon the
cable operator. On the one hand, section 76.251(a)(9) provides that the
operator "shall exercise no control over 'program content," 'but section 76.251
(a)(11) requires him to exclude some types of programming-lotteries and
obscenity. The FCC does not suggest a way in which the operator can cen-
sor without exercising any control over content.
In addition, the actual implementation of the access requirements has
caused more than just legal problems for the cable operator. The FCC has
given quite a few systems until March 1977 to conform to the rules primarily
because of the "financial hardship" involved in providing the additional chan-
nels 'and production facilities for access.' 38
131. D. ORTHMER, supra note 128, at 2.
132. 33 Fed. Reg. 3188, 3189 n.2 (1968).
133. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.201-.251 (1973).
134. 47 C.F.R. §'76.201(a) (1973).
135. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(8) (1973).
136. See, e.g., Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L REV. 419 (1972).
137. Price & Botein, Cable Television: Citizen Participation After The Franchise 4
(The Rand Corp. R-1139-NSF, 1973).
138. See, e.g., TelePrompter Cable Comm. Corp., 31 P. & F.2d 469 (1974). Not
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Responding to the criticisms concerning the vagaries of the provisions,
the FCC has recently promulgated a Clarification of Rules and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking139 which repeats the refrain that its previous rules
were "experimental in nature and would be clarified, modified, or changed
as the situation warranted," and that now "[t]he time has come, after two
years of operational experience, to make some modifications and clarifica-
tions of our rules to keep pace with the changing picture presented by ca-
ble's development and to resolve whatever ambiguities exist.' 140 Using that
exemplary goal as a standard, the access program has been "carefully
weighed" by the FCC and found to be both reasonable and within the
public interest. Certain points have been clarified, however. First, con-
glomerate cable systems which serve a large number of small suburban
communities may petition for a waiver which would allow the joint use of
access channels and facilities. 141 Second, any franchises which seek to re-
quire the cable operator to furnish more than the federally prescribed num-
ber of access channels must be "reasonable and necessary for a planned
local program of use."' 142 Third, on the free access channels, an individual
can "reserve" a particular time on a regular basis, but all "desirable time
slots" must not be "frozen.' 43  Fourth, commercial educational enterprises
(computer schools, beauty schools, etc.) would not be "proper" users of the
"education access channel.'" 144  Fifth, the FCC's access rule would work
better if county governments would indicate what they consider to be "dis-
crete communities," because "such delineations are, after all, uniquely a
part of the responsibility of local officials.' 45 Sixth, the FCC does not think
that it is a "particularly good idea" that local franchising authorilties specify
the kinds of equipment (cameras, microphones, etc.) th'at must be made
available for use on the access channels, but the FCC will not disallow these
"service packages" unless they are "clearly excessive.' 46  Such packages
would not be acceptable, however, if equipment were given specifically to
any one group, to the practical exclusion of others. Finally, the FCC plans
to issue a document "shortly" which will address the problem of whether to
all of the waiver requests have been granted. Champlain Cable, 30 P. & F.2d 25
(1974).
139. 39 Fed. Reg. 14288 (1974).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 14289.
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allow local authorities to use a two percent franchise fee to help fund access
to the system.
147
As the "clarifications" enumerated above indicate, the FCC has simply
added another layer of language between cable television and the imple-
mentation of a localized access program. The endless cycle of definition
and redefinition has begun. One can envision private and government at-
torneys soon arguing over the distinction between a "reserved" time slot and
a "frozen" one.
In 1972, one well-respected commentator indicated that the FCC's access
rules do not go far enough in providing formulas for determining how the
access channels will be used in a particular community.148  He proposes
discarding both local administrative and simple marketplace regulation of
access, and implementing a plan which would apportion access between
commercial and non-commercial uses on the basis of time period rather
than channels; give each time allocation an "attractiveness index" according
to its ,audience share; and bar the operator from controlling the program
content.1
49
As should be readily apparent, this suggestion for public access to cable
suffers from the same defect as the access rules it seeks to improve. Con-
fusing one medium with another, the agency and its proponents react to the
obvious regulatory problems of implementing access by recommending more
regulations, each more detailed than its predecessor. Clearly, such appli-
cations of incredibly complex governmental rules will not promote access,
but retard it. Fortunately, OTP's proposed amendment to the Communi-
cations Act offers a more sensible and generally pragmatic approach to cable
television in general and access in particular.
A. The Whitehead Report and the OTP Proposals
On June 27, 1971, President Nixon announced the formation of the Cabi-
net Committee on Cable Communications' 50 to formulate proposals for a
comprehensive national policy on cable communications. The Committee's
147. Id. at 14300.
148. Botein, supra note 136, at 438-55.
149. Id.
150. The committee was composed of Peter G. Peterson, Secretary of Commerce;
Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; George Romney, Sec-
retary of Housing and Urban Development; and Presidential advisers Herbert G. Klein,
Leonard Garment and Robert H. Finch. Clay T. Whitehead, Director of the Office of
Telecommunications Policy, served as Chairman of the Committee, and his office con-




report,' 5 issued in January 1974, represents the most innovative govern-
mental response to cable communications that has occurred during cable's
twenty-five year history.
The Committee has examined the growth of cable communications
and the governmental response to it, and we have concluded that
a new policy is needed. . . . At the heart of the Committee's rec-
ommendations is a proposed policy that would separate control of
the cable medium from control of the messages on it. The goal
of this policy is to assure the development of cable as a communica-
tions medium open to all, free of both excessive concentrations
of private power and undue government control . . . . Our specif-
ic recommendations . . . flow from this basic policy proposal;
their thrust is that neither the local monopoly power of each cable
system nor the government regulatory power necessary to prevent
abuse of that private power should be extended to the programs or
other content of cable's channels.
152
With this "separations policy" as its key rationale, 153 the Committee offered
both transitional and long-range recommendations to free cable from the
stranglehold of the current rules and to permit its independent growth as a
different and distinct medium. Specifically,' 54 the Committee suggested that
cable operators should be required to offer their channels for lease to others
for any lawful purpose, without discrimination among "comparable" users
(e.g., commercial v. non-commercial); to comply with total channel capacity
requirements of the FCC and the franchising authority and with the mini-
mum technical standards established for cable distribution by the FCC; to
offer subscribers a selective means to prevent reception of personally un-
desirable programming and the interception of confidential information dis-
tributed over the cable. An operator would be -allowed to own and operate
any other media in the market area, but would be prohibited from having
any financial or ownership interest in, or control over, ,the production, selec-
tion, financing or marketing of the programs cablecast over his leased chan-
nels; nor could the operator jointly own or control any interest in groups of
cable systems, interconnection facilities or program supply services.
Channel users would be required to adhere to the copyright laws and
accept full criminal and civil liability for programs they originate." 55 The
151. See note 19 supra.
152. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
153. The "separations" idea is not new. See Filings by the Electronic Industries As-
sociation, Doc. no. 18397, CATV, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
154. The following specific recommendations are summarized in CABLE REPORT, Su-
pra note 19, ch. VI.
155. Presently the cable operator may also be held liable; he must therefore exercise
censorship over programs, or face possible prosecution. See p. 11 supra.
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users would be allowed to lease channels and obtain distribution services from
any cable systems, offer the public any lawful program, establish their own
prices for any programs they produce or supply and take legal action against
any cable operator who discriminates against them because of the program
content or the user's race, religion, nationality or beliefs, or who charges dis-
criminatory rates for the cable's use. 156
The FCC would be prohibited from regulating the content of the cable
programs in any way, including any affirmative obligation requiring "bal-
ance" of news; designating channels for special uses; regulating rates or re-
quiring free service; limiting, by regulation or policy, the ownership of cable
systems by broadcast stations or networks, newspapers, magazines or any
other media; or limiting the number of systems owned by any one firm, or
the number of subscribers to be served by any one firm. 157 The FCC would
be allowed to establish minimum technical standards, require adequate chan-
nel capacity, and apply restrictions on the presentation, for. a fee, of pro-
fessional sports programs. 15 s  Otherwise, the local franchising authorities
would have the bulk of the responsibility in setting up cable systems in their
own communities.' 59
B. Implementation of the Recommendations:
A Proposed Amendment
In April 1974, Clay T. Whitehead, Director of the Office of Telecommuni-
cations Policy, sent a draft bill to Congress which is designed to implement
the new national cable communications policy outlined in the Whitehead
Report. 60
The proposed bill would not only completely amend the present rules,
but, more importantly, the amendment explicitly recognizes "that the appli-
cation of current policies respecting the communications media to cable com-
156. CABLE REPORT, supra note 19, ch. VI.
157. Id.
158. The acquisition of professional sports program rights has been a major area of
dispute between the cable and broadcasting industries for some time. In 1969, Repre-
sentative James Harvey (R-Mich.) asked the Chairman of the FCC what the Commis-
sion was doing to "protect the American viewing public" from having to pay to watch
football games. See 1969 Hearings 34-35; see also id. at 53, 68-69. Recently cable en-
thusiasts won a victory when the Senate Judiciary Committee killed a provision in a pro-
posed copyright bill that would have blacked out major sports events from most cable
systems in the country. Carmody, A Cable TV Victory: Still in the Big League, The
Washington Post, June 12, 1974, § C at 4, col. 1.
159. CABLE REPORT, supra note 19, ch. I at 28.
160. Letter from Clay T. Whitehead to the Honorable Carl Albert, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, April 1974.
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munications is inappropriate in that the technology of cable systems elim-
inates the channel scarcity."'" Although its provisions are manifold, the
pertinent public access system can be described simply. Section 708(e)
mandates that the local franchising authority, not the FCC, shall simply
require the reservation of one channel which shall be available
upon request to any person, free of charge, for any purpose, pur-
suant to such terms and conditions, consistent with Section 710(a)
of this title, as the licensing authority shall, by regulation, adopt
In line with the inherent "localism" of cable systems, this explicit s-tatu-
tory provision guarantees that at least one "electronic soapbox" will be avail-
able to the public, regulated locally, and, significantly, any local restrictions
on free speech will be subjected to the careful scrutiny of the federal district
courts (Section 710(a)). The combination of this provision with the gen-
eral "separations policy" of the proposed amendment, under which the
cable operator will have no control over, nor liability for, the programs he
distributes, perhaps means that partial public access to cable television can
finally occur, in contrast to the dearth of public access which, as a result of
the Supreme Court's CBS decision, currently characterizes the broadcast in-
dustry.'
6 2
Both the Canadian and New York experiences involving access to cable
indicate that this new medium can fulfill the prophecies made on its behalf
nearly a decade ago. The technology is undoubtedly there, and hopefully
those experiments will spawn others. But more than anything else the time
has come for Congress to provide the FCC and the cable industry with the
national guidelines they have sought for so long, and to finally allow cable to
realize its potential as the twentieth-century soapbox. Adoption of OTP's
proposals will provide no panacea, but it would at least signal an end to the
regulatory myopia which has for so long confused one medium with another.
Roy L. Mason
161. Id.
162. See the discussion of the CBS decision, p. 110 supra.
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